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is insured.4 These doubts might well be resolved by questions relating to insurance connections.
Narrowly restricting the voir dire inquiry, as did the Wheeler case, does not
adequately solve the problem. While there remains a possibility that one of the
jurors may be biased in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's right to a fair
trial is, to that extent, imperiled. The solution offered by the Wheeler case may,
in addition, lead to other undesirable consequences. It may induce plaintiffs to
approach prospective jurors before the voir dire in order to gain information
that will bring them within the "good faith" requirement suggested in the case;
it may also unduly prolong the voir dire examination.
A more satisfactory solution would be found in legislation authorizing the
addition of a question on the form questionnaire which jurors are at present
required to answer, concerning their relationships, direct and indirect, with insuirance companies.'s Such legislation might also permit counsel to challenge
jurors for cause on the basis of information disclosed in the questionnaire.'"

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS AFFECTED
BY THIRD PARTY'S PRESENCE
The only evidence offered in support of a claim against a decedent's estate
was the testimony of an attorney who had represented the decedent for eleven
years prior to her death. Over objection, he was permitted to testify that the
decedent had said to the claimant in his presence, "You are going to get your
$5,ooo, don't worry about it,... it will be paid as soon as 'The Elms' [a part
of the decedent's husband's estate] are sold," and also that the decedent had
24 The Chicago Motor Club estimates that 75 to 8o per cent of the motorists in the state
of Illinois carry liability insurance. Private communication from Mr. A. Ulrich, Jr., Underwriter, The Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club (February 4, 1948).
s Compare 43 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1444), noting Moore v. Edmonds, 384 Ill. 535, 52 N.E.
2d 26 (1943). Individuals eligible for jury service are required to answer the questionnaire
at the time they are placed on the jury list. Its contents are governed by statute. Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1947) c. 78, § 25. Since there may be a considerable lapse of time between the date when
the questionnaire is answered and the date when jury service begins, it would be advisable for
the legislation to provide for additional questioning at the commencement of the juror's
service as to changes in his interests.
6 While each counsel is now permitted five peremptory challenges where there are only
two record parties to the litigation, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 110, § 19o, the plaintiff will be
afforded much greater protection if, in addition, he can automatically exclude from jury
service those who might be biased in favor of the insurance company. A New York statute
makes an interest in any liability insurance company a ground for challenge in personal injury
suits. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) § 452. In Illinois a juror's connection with
the defendant's insurer is probably a ground for challenge for cause. See Smithers v. Henriquez, 287 Ill. App. 95, 4 N.E. 2d 793 (1936). In other jurisdictions it has been held that a
direct connection with an insurance company other than the one in suit is not a ground for
challenge for cause. Anderson v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 63 F. Supp. 229 (N.Y., 1945); see
Vega v. Evans, X28 Ohio 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934); Mortrude v. Martin, i85 Iowa 1319, r72
N.W. 17 (i919). This question has not arisen in Illinois.
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said to him that she wanted to sell "The Elms" as soon as possible in order to
pay off the claimant. These admissions were made in the attorney's office during
a conference relating to the administration of the estate of the decedent's husband. At the time of the conference the claimant was the business agent and
personal servant of the decedent. A decision by the trial court disallowing the
claim was reversed by the circuit court. Upon appeal by the administrator to
the appellate court, the circuit court was reversed on two grounds: i) The
statements of the decedent, although made in the presence of a third partythe claimant-were privileged, since the claimant was decedent's agent at the
time of the communication. 2) Even if the testimony was competent, it was
insufficient to establish the claim. In re Bsse's Estate.'
Availability of an alternative ground for reversal, namely, the insufficiency of2
the attorney's testimony to discharge the claimant's burden of persuasion,
made the court's reliance on the attorney-client privilege unnecessary. More
important, this reliance was unjustified because the communication was not
made under such circumstances as to bring it within the usual scope of the
privilege. Generally, the privilege is said to embrace communications made in
confidence by the client to the attorney in connection with the solicitation of
legal advice.3 In the present case there was no showing that the client's admission of indebtedness was relevant to any professional advice being sought.4 On
the contrary, it appeared from the testimony that the attorney first learned of
the claim as a result of the incidental disclosure made by the decedent to the
claimant and that the attorney was asked for no legal advice in relation thereto.
Clearly such statements, irrelevant to any legal business, are not within the
scope of the privilege. A few courts have gone so far as to hold that the privilege
285, 75 N.E. 2d 36 (1947).
2The court held that the claimant had the burden of supporting her claim with clear and
convincing evidence. This burden of persuasion appears extremely severe in light of the fact
that the claimant herself was incompetent to testify because of the Illinois "deadman's
statute," which excludes any testimony for or against a deceased person by an "interested
party," i.e., one who would stand to gain or lose by the direct operation of the legal judgment.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 51, § 2. Compare Johnson v. Matthews, 3o1 Ill.
App. 295, 22 N.E. 2d
7'72"(i939). Nevertheless, the Illinois courts have required "clear and convincing" evidence in
claims against deceased persons. Compare Doll v. Continental Illinois National Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 326 Ill.
App. 264, 61 N.E. 2d 875 (1945); In re Estate of Teehan, 287 Ill.
1332 Ill.
App.

App. 58, 4 N.E. 2d 513 (1936). Most jurisdictions merely require a preponderence of the evidence to support a claim against an estate. Compare In re Tyler, X27 Neb. 681, 256 N.W. 518
(1934); In re Grismer's Will, 225 App. Div. 804, 232 N.Y. Supp. 44o (1929); In re Dolmage's

Estate, 204 Iowa 231, 213 N.W. 38o (1927).
38 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (3d ed., i94o). For a critical analysis of the rationale behind
the attorney-client privilege see Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications between
Lawyer and Client, i6 Calif. L. Rev. 486 (1928).
4Faced with a somewhat similar situation an Oklahoma court admitted the testimony of
the attorney since ". ..it does not appear that this communication was one which came to
the witness in his capacity as attorney for the defendant." Joy v. Litchfield, i89 Okla. 122,
123, 113 P. 2d 974, 975 (1941); cf. Modem Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F. 2d 352
(C.C.4. 5 th, 1942).
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does not protect any communications from the client to a third party, even
though made at a conference with an attorney in which all three parties are
participatings Such a distinction between statements made to attorneys and
those made to third persons at the same conference is at best tenuous and was
ignored by the present court.
The court, overlooking the fact that the claimant's disclosures were not made
in order to secure legal advice, went on to consider the problems raised by the
fact that the communications were made not in strict privacy to the attorney
but in the presence of a third person. The willingness of a client to communicate
with an attorney in the presence of a third party is generally held to negative
any inference of confidence and to prevent the privilege from arising. 6 An exception is recognized, however, when the third person is present in order to
facilitate the consultation.7 The presence of a secretary of the attorney or an
agent of the client intimately connected with the legal business has been said
not to destroy the privilege. 8 The claimant in the present case was employed in
connection with the administration of the estate. Thus her presence at the conference in that capacity was not sufficient to prevent the privilege from arising.
In some jurisdictions, where two independent parties consult the same attorney and subsequently become adversaries in litigation, the privilege does not
cover communications made to the attorney while both parties were present.'
s Hanson v. Bean, 51 Minn. 546, 53 N.W. 871 (x892); Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal. 331
(1863) (communication between client and third person present held not privileged; held otherwise as to confidential communication directly to attorney at same meeting); Coveney v.
Tannahill, i Hl (N.Y.) 33 (1841). Where a communication is made to an attorney for the
purpose of being conveyed by him to another it is not privileged. Hill v. Hill, io6 Colo. 492,
107 P. 2d 597 (I94O); Riley v. State, i8o Ga. 869, ii S.E. 154 (i93); Scott v. Harris, 13
Ill. 447 (x885).
6Ver Bryck v. Luby, 67 Cal. App. 2d 842, 155 P. 2d 7o6 (i945); Crawford v. Raible, 2o6
Iowa 732, 221 N.W. 474 (1928); People v. Buchanan, i45 N.Y. i, 39 N.E. 846 (1895).
7 Originally this exception applied only to interpreters who were the medium of communication between attorney and client. Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 97 (1922); Morton v.
Smith, 44 S.W. 683 (Tex. Civ. App., 1898); Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172 (x859).
8 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (3d ed., 1940).
9 Thus, where an attorney represents joint plaintiffs or defendants, he may testify in a subsequent suit between the clients as to their communications to him, although such communications are privileged in any litigation with outside parties. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v.
H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F. 2d 823 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941); Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis. 365,
289 N.W. 652 (i94o); Stewart v. Todd, 29o Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (i919). Such a result has
been justified on this ground: "The matter communicated was not in its nature private as
between those parties present at the time it was made, and consequently so far as they are
concerned, it can not, in any sense, be deemed the subject of a confidential communication
made by one which the duty of the attorney prohibits him from disclosing to the other."
Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. 417, 418 (1854).
Similarly, when both parties to a deed consult the same attorney, statements made at the
conference can be introduced in evidence in a subsequent suit between grantor and grantee.
Oard v. Dolan, 320 11.371, 151 N.E. 244 (1926); cf. Griffin v. Williams, 179 Ga. 175, 175 S.E.
449 (1934); Doll v. Loesel, 288 Pa. 527, 136 Ati. 796 (1927); Scott v. Aultman, 211 Ill. 612,
71 N.E. XIX2 (i9o4); Smick's Adm'r v. Bestwick's Adm'r, 113 Ky. 439, 68 S.W. 439 (1902);
Thompson v. Cashman, i8i Mass. 36, 62 N.E. 976 (1902). For an excellent statement of the
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It is true that in such cases the presence of the third party may be as necessary
to facilitate the legal business as was the presence of the agent in the instant
case. Nevertheless, the instant case may be distinguished inasmuch as the agent
occupied a confidential relationship to the decedent. In a recent Ohio case ° the
privilege was invoked in respect to an admission of indebtedness made by the
client to the attorney in the presence of the claimant. The claimant was a private detective employed by the client in connection with a pending divorce
which the attorney was handling. The court, in recognizing the privilege, relied
on the fact that the private detective was the client's confidential agent at the
time of the communication. Under the circumstances the court felt it was "essential to the ends of justice that clients should be safe in confiding to their
counsel the most secret facts and to receive advice without the perils of publicity.""
Recognition of the privilege on the ground that the client's disclosure made
in the presence of the agent and the attorney was "secret" or "confidential" is
merely a way of stating the result. It is clear that the communication is not
more secret as to the third person present merely because he is a confidential
agent. There is, however, a practical difference between the two situations: The
agent is present in order to promote or protect the interests of the client rather
than his own. The client may, therefore, be freer with his disclosures in the
agent's presence than he would be in the presence of a party with independent
interests. He may also have more reason to expect non-disclosure by his agent.
The recognition of the privilege will, of course, protect such expectation and
may help to promote full disclosure by clients to attorneys. The reasons for
recognizing the privilege in this situation are therefore strong, and the fact that
the confidential agent turns adversary would scarcely seem to justify the spreading of confidences on the public record of a trial.
It may be concluded, then, that had the communications in the instant case
been made with a view to receiving legal advice, the court's recognition of the
privilege would have been proper inasmuch as the. claimant was a confidential
agent of the decedent. Since, however, the communications did not appear to be
connected with the legal business at hand, the court was clearly unwarranted
in relying on the privilege.
rationale supporting this line of cases see Stone v. Minton, iii Ga. 45, 47, 36 S.E. 321, 323
(i9oo).
The attorney-client privilege is also limited in cases where two parties consult an attorney
in regard to a contract of employment over which a controversy between them later arises.
Joy v. Litchfield, i89 Okla. 122, 113 P. 2d 974 (194i); Lawless v. Schoenaker, 147 N.Y. Misc.
626, 264 N.Y. Supp. 28o (x933).

10Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E. 2d 845 (1941).
1h
Ibid., at 594, 846.

